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Abstract. In this paper we give a specification of a new block cipher
that can be called the Courtois Toy Cipher (CTC). It is quite simple,
and yet very much like any other known block cipher. If the parameters
are large enough, it should evidently be secure against all known attack
methods. However, we are not proposing a new method for encrypting
sensitive data, but rather a research tool that should allow us (and other
researchers) to experiment with algebraic attacks on block ciphers and
obtain interesting results using a PC with reasonable quantity of RAM.
For this reason the S-box of this cipher has only 3-bits, which is quite
small.
Ciphers with very small S-boxes are believed quite secure, for example the
Serpent S-box has only 4 bits, and in DES all the S-boxes have 4 output
bits. The AES S-box is not quite as small but can be described (in many
ways) by a very small systems of equations with only a few monomials
(and this fact can also be exploited in algebraic cryptanalysis). We believe
that results on algebraic cryptanalysis of this cipher will have very deep
implications for the security of ciphers in general.
Key Words: algebraic attacks on block ciphers, AES, Rijndael, Serpent,
multivariate quadratic equations, MQ problem, overdefined systems of multivari-
ate equations, XL algorithm, XSL algorithm, Gro¨bner bases, solving systems of
sparse multivariate polynomial equations.
1 Introduction
Claude Shannon, the father of information security as a science, has once advised
that, breaking a good cipher should require “as much work as solving a system
of simultaneous equations in a large number of unknowns”, see [9]. This is an
important and very explicit recommandation, yet it was ignored and nearly
forgotten for more than 50 years.
The public researcher on symmetric cryptography have concentrated on lo-
cal and statistical aspects of ciphers, and have overlooked the natural “global”
approach of the problem. The secret key is defined as a solution of a system of
algebraic equations that describes the whole cipher. This system should not be
too simple, otherwise somebody might be able solve it...
The United States government encryption standard, AES, which is also ex-
pected to become a global de-facto encryption standard, is based on a particu-
larly simple system of algebraic equations. This creates many uneasy feelings as a
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growing number of symmetric primitives (block ciphers, stream ciphers and hash
functions) turn out to be insecure and are being broken by algebraic attacks. If
AES is broken, it will have very serious consequences.
2 The Design of the CTC Block Cipher
CTC is an abbreviation for Courtois Toy Cipher. It has been designed in order
to have the following properties:
a. It should be very simple, practical, and be implemented with a minimal
effort.
b. It should be in general very much like any other known block cipher. If the
parameters are large enough it should evidently be secure against all known
attacks on block ciphers.
c. For simplicity, the key size should be equal to block size.
d. It should have a variable number of rounds and variable number of S-boxes
in each round. However since it is a ”research cipher” it is not required that
it must encrypt 128-bit blocks. It can use for example 129-bit blocks (in fact
it will be any multiple of 3).
e. The S-box should be chosen as a random permutation, and thus have no
special structure.
f. Yet this S-box should exhibit an “algebraically vulnerability”, by which we
mean that it should be described by a small system of multivariate non-linear
equations. This is made possible in spite of (e.) because the size of the S-box
is quite small.
g. The diffusion should be very good: full avalanche effect should be achieved
after about 3-4 rounds.
h. However, at the same time, the diffusion should not be too good, so that the
linear parts of the cipher can still be described by (linear) equations that
remain quite sparse. (In CTC each bit in the next round is a XOR of two
bits from the outputs of two S-boxes from the previous round).
i. Finally and importantly, the cipher should allow to handle complete ex-
perimental algebraic attacks on block ciphers using a standard PC, with a
reasonable quantity of RAM, and not more than a handful of plaintext /
ciphertext pairs.
The simplest way we have found, to design a cipher that satisfies all these
criteria, is to:
1. [Easy] Take the toy cipher described by Courtois and Pieprzyk in the ap-
pendix of the eprint paper [4] and improve the diffusion (that was excessively
poor).
2. [Hard] Then in order to assure (i.), work on algebraic attacks and demon-
strate that indeed it can be broken in practice even when parameters are
quite large...
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3 The Description of the CTC Block Cipher
Here is a short description of Courtois Toy Cipher (CTC) (notations are similar
as in [4]).
1. CTC is quite similar to Serpent, except that it is much simpler, and the key
schedule is a simple permutation of key bits, like for example in DES.
2. The S-box is the following permutation on s = 3 bits that has been chosen
as a random non-linear permutation: {7, 6, 0, 4, 2, 5, 1, 3}. We will number its
bits as follows: the input of the S-box is: 4 ·x3+2 ·x2+x1, while the output
is 4 · y3 + 2 · y2 + y1.
3. This S-box gives r = 14 fully quadratic equations with t = 22 terms, i.e.
equations of the type:∑
αijxixj +
∑
βijyiyj +
∑
γijxiyj +
∑
δixi +
∑
iyi + η = 0
To be more precise, these equations are exactly:
0 = x1x2 + y1 + x3 + x2 + x1 + 1
0 = x1x3 + y2 + x2 + 1
0 = x1y1 + y2 + x2 + 1
0 = x1y2 + y2 + y1 + x3
0 = x2x3 + y3 + y2 + y1 + x2 + x1 + 1
0 = x2y1 + y3 + y2 + y1 + x2 + x1 + 1
0 = x2y2 + x1y3 + x1
0 = x2y3 + x1y3 + y1 + x3 + x2 + 1
0 = x3y1 + x1y3 + y3 + y1
0 = x3y2 + y3 + y1 + x3 + x1
0 = x3y3 + x1y3 + y2 + x2 + x1 + 1
0 = y1y2 + y3 + x1
0 = y1y3 + y3 + y2 + x2 + x1 + 1
0 = y2y3 + y3 + y2 + y1 + x3 + x1
(1)
4. The number of rounds is Nr.
5. Let B = 1, 2, . . . , 128 be the number of S-boxes in each round. There are
B ∗ s bits in each round. We number them 0..Bs− 1, and we have in order
0 being x1 of the first S-box, then we have x2, x3 of the first S-box, then
x1, x2, x3 of the second S-box (if any), etc.
6. The key size is equal to the block size and has Hk = B ∗ s bits, so that one
known plaintext should be (on average) sufficient to determine (more or less
uniquely) the secret key K0 = (K0 1, . . . ,K0 Bs).
7. Each round i consists of the XOR with the derived key Ki−1, a parallel
application of the B S-boxes, and then of a linear diffusion layer D is applied
(this replaces the simple permutation of wires used in [4]).
For the last round an additional derived key KNr is XORed (as in AES).
8. We denote Xi j , for i = 1..Nr, j = 0..Bs− 1, the inputs of the i− th round
after the XOR with the derived key.
9. We denote Zi j , for i = 1..Nr, j = 0..Bs− 1, the outputs of the i− th round
before the XOR with the next derived key.
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Fig. 1. A toy cipher with B = 2 S-boxes per round
10. I order to have uniform notations, we may also denote the plaintext by Z0
and the ciphertext byXNr+1. These should not considered as variable names,
but as abbreviations that denote (known) constant values.
11. There is no S-boxes in the key schedule and the derived key in round i, Ki
is obtained from the secret key K0, by a very simple permutation of wires:
Ki j
def
= K0 (j+i mod Bs). (2)
12. With all these notations, the linear equations from the key schedule are as
follows:
Xi+1 j = Zi j ⊕Ki j for all i = 0..Nr. (3)
13. The diffusion part D of the cipher is defined as follows:{
Zi (257 mod Bs) = Yi 0 for all i = 1..Nr
Zi (j·1987+257 mod Bs) = Yi j ⊕ Yi (j+137 mod Bs) for j 6= 0 and all i.
(4)
4 Cryptanalytic Results on CTC
4.1 How To Solve It
This is an early announcement of a new cryptographic attack that is still under
development. Our method to break this cipher is a completely generic alge-
braic method for solving multivariate equations applied blindly to the systems
of equations generated, without special tricks that would exploit the particu-
lar structure of this cipher. Technically speaking, it is an efficient method for
computing Gro¨bner bases well-suited for systems of equations derived from block
ciphers. It is called the “Fast Algebraic Attack on Block Ciphers” and was
first (more or less experimentally) discovered by Nicolas Courtois on November
14th 2005.
In order to protect the United States government, the financial institutions,
mobile phone operators, and hundreds of millions of other people that use AES,
from criminals and terrorists, the exact description of the attack will for some
time not be published. Public demonstrations of the effectiveness of the attack
will be organised instead. However one should understand that the attack is
quite simple and fatally will be re-discovered (and published).
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A public demonstration of the Fast Algebraic Attack on Block Ciphers will
be done during the Quo Vadis 4 conference, in Warsaw, Poland, on May 26th
2006.
4.2 Some Preliminary Results
On 13 May 2006, Nicolas Courtois has broken 6 rounds of CTC with 85 S-boxes
per round faster than by exhaustive search (the key size is 255 bits). A full key
recovery attack was implemented and have completed, on a 2.8 GHz PC with 2
gigabytes of RAM. The total number of S-boxes in this cipher is 510, more than
twice as many as in AES. The attack requires 64 chosen plaintexts (low degree
equations on key bits with no extra variables are obtained already for 2 chosen
plaintexts).
The “Fast Algebraic Attack on Block Ciphers” is a known plaintext
attack. However, chosen plaintexts do help. If the plaintexts are really random,
we can currently break CTC (again recover the full key) for 4 rounds and 85
S-boxes per round given only 2 known plaintexts (!). Similarly, 3 rounds are
broken given only 1 known plaintext (!).
4.3 What Do We Achieve ?
Given only few plaintexts, in many interesting cases, our algebraic attacks will
certainly be the best known attacks on this cipher (for example nobody has ever
proposed an attack that gives low degree equations on the key and/or recovers
the full key given only 1 known plaintext). It would be the first time in the
history, that a block cipher with no special algebraic structure and
with a (very) large number of S-boxes is broken in practice by an
algebraic attack.
Given more plaintexts, other attacks could also allow to break this cipher and
we invite other cryptanalysts to break this cipher, by any method. In the future,
we expect to break even more rounds of this cipher, that (hopefully) should be
out of reach of other attack methods. We also believe that many other ciphers
will be broken by our new attack.
5 Conclusion
Up till now all work on practical algebraic attacks on block ciphers have failed
to produce interesting results.
With our current simulations, algebraic attacks on block ciphers appear to
be (well, at least for CTC...) much easier and much faster than it was
ever expected. More details will be published soon.
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